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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

JAMES WEBB,

:

Plaintiff/Appellant,

:

v.

:

THE UNIVERSITY OF UTAH, a division of
the State of Utah,

:

Case No. 20020985-CA

Defendant/Appellee,
PARK PLAZA CONDOMINIUM OWNERS' :
ASSOCIATION, a Utah NoiWProfit
Corporation, and JONETTE WEBSTER,
:
Defendants.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from an order dismissing plaintiffs claim of negligence against
defendant University of Utah (R. 73-75). Plaintiff, James Webb, filed his complaint in
the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on September
28, 1999 (R. 1-3). The complaint alleged that the University's negligence in conducting a
field trip resulted in injuries to Webb. The University moved to dismiss under Utah R.
Civ. P. 12(b)(6) on the ground that it owed no duty to Webb (R. 18-26). Following an
exchange of memoranda and a hearing, the motion was granted by order entered January
31, 2000 (R. 73-75). Webb filed three unsuccessful interlocutory appeals

(R. 79-80, 111-12, and 117-18) between the time of this order and the dismissal of the
last party remaining before the district court on November 13, 2002 (R. 150-52). His
fourth, timely notice of appeal was filed one week later (R. 153-54). Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-2a-3(2)(j) (Supp. 2002) gives this Court jurisdiction over the appeal as transferred
from the Utah Supreme Court by order of December 23, 2002.
ISSUE PRESENTED UPON APPEAL
The sole issue presented upon appeal is whether the district court correctly
dismissed Webb's claim against the University of Utah based on the absence of a duty
running to him.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES, AND RULES
All relevant text of constitutional provisions, statutes, and rules pertinent to the
issues before the Court for decision is contained in the body of this brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings, and Disposition Below
Webb filed his complaint in this case in September, 1999 (R. 1-3), alleging, as to

the University, that it negligently conducted a scheduled class field trip, resulting in
injuries to him. The University moved to dismiss Webb's claim against it under Utah R.
Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (R. 18-26) on the ground that, under Beach v. University of Utah. 726
P.2d 413 (Utah 1986), the University was under no special duty to Webb that would
confer liability. After Webb's response (R. 35-38) and the University's reply (R. 47-57),
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the district court heard the motion (R. 72), which was granted by order entered January
31, 2000 (R. 73-75).
On February 28, 2000, Webb filed a notice of appeal from the order of dismissal
(R. 79-80). The Utah Supreme Court dismissed the appeal without prejudice as taken
from a non-final order. See Webb v. University of Utah. No. 20000181 (Addendum A,
attached). Webb then moved the district court to certify the order of dismissal as final
pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 54(b) (R. 90-96). On October 11, 2000, after the judge
granted the Rule 54(b) motion by minute entry (R. 99-100) but before an order was
entered, Webb filed a second notice of appeal (R. 111-12). Once the order was entered
on October 25, 2000 (R. 115-16), a third notice of appeal was filed on November 1, 2000
(R. 117-18). Both the second and third appeals were transferred from the supreme court
to this Court for disposition, where they were consolidated and dismissed for improper
certification. See Webb v University of Utah. Nos. 20000881-CA and 20000980-CA
(Addendum B, attached).
Following the dismissal of the last party remaining before the district court by
orders entered November 13, 2002 (R. 150-52), Webb filed his fourth andfinalnotice of
appeal on November 20, 2002 (R. 153-54).
B.

Statement of Relevant Facts
The relevant facts in this case are few. On March 7, 1998, while he was a student

at the University of Utah, Webb participated in a scheduled class field trip which was
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conducted outdoors (R. 2,fflf6-7 and 9). During the field trip, a fellow student slipped,
causing Webb to fall and become injured (R. 2-3, 1fij 11 and 15).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
On appeal, Webb premises his argument on the alleged existence of a contractual
relationship with the University (see Aplt. Brief at 4-5). Webb did not raise his
contractual theory in the district court, depriving both the University and the court of an
opportunity to respond to it. Because it has been raised for the first time on appeal, the
contract theory is not appropriate for consideration here.
This case is controlled by the decision of the Utah Supreme Court in Beach v.
University of Utah, holding that the student-teacher relationship, in the context of a
mandatory field trip sponsored by a public university, is, by itself, insufficient to create a
special duty running from the university to the student. While Webb attempts to
distinguish Beach on the basis of an Arizona case, he fails to recognize that Arizona,
unlike Utah, has explicitly rejected the "special duty" or "special relationship" doctrine on
which Beach is based. In addition, the other cases on which Webb relies either involve
private entities to which the special duty analysis does not apply or, contrary to
controlling Utah precedent, find a general duty sufficient to support liability. As in
Beach, the University had no reason in the case at bar to believe that Webb's situation was
distinguishable from that of the other students on the field trip, and therefore, it stood in
no special relationship with him that can sustain a duty.
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Because Webb failed to establish that the University owed a duty to him as an
individual, there are no grounds on which to reverse the trial court's dismissal of his
claim.
ARGUMENT
Standard of Review: "Because the propriety of a dismissal under Utah Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) is a question of law, we give the trial court's ruling no deference
and review it under a correctness standard.1' Warner v. DMG Color. Inc.. 2000 UT 102,
1f6,20P.3d868.
I. PLAINTIFF'S ARGUMENT OF A CONTRACT THEORY FOR THE
FIRST TIME ON APPEAL IS NOT ENTITLED TO CONSIDERATION.
For the first time on appeal, Webb newly premises his argument that the University
owed him a duty of care on an alleged contractual relationship (see Aplt. Brief at 4-5).
However, he identifies no point in the record showing that he argued his contract theory
to the district court or that the district court ruled on the issue. Webb has not met his
burden under Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(5) to provide either f,(a)(5)(A) citation to the record
showing that the issue was preserved in the trial court; or (a)(5(B) a statement of grounds
for seeking review of an issue not preserved in the trial court." Rule 24 embodies the
established practice of Utah's appellate courts of declining to consider issues raised for
the first time on appeal. See Strawberrv Elec. Serv. Dist. v. Spanish Fork City. 918 P.2d
870, 880 (Utah 1996); Astill v. Clark. 956 P.2d 1081, 1088 (Utah App. 1998). This
practice applies whether the new material is characterized as an argument or an issue:
5

Defendants contend that we should reach this and other new points raised
for the first time on appeal because they are really new arguments as
opposed to new issues. We decline to honor such a distinction. Our
concern is whether an argument was addressed in the first instance to the
trial court."
Ong Int'l OJ.S.A.) Inc. v. 11th Ave. Corp., 850 P.2d 447, 455 n.31 (Utah 1993).
By not raising his contract theory in the district court, Webb foreclosed any
opportunity for either the University or the court to address it. He has articulated no plain
error or exceptional circumstances that would preclude application of the appellate courts'
general rule of declining to consider issues newly raised on appeal. See State v. Hardy,
2002 UT App 244, ^ 15, 54 P.3d 645. Consequently, the contract theory is not
appropriately before this Court for consideration.
II. UNDER THE BINDING AUTHORITY OF BEACH, PLAINTIFF
CANNOT ESTABLISH THAT THE UNIVERSITY IS UNDER A DUTY
TO HIM.
Beach v. University of Utah is both factually and legally analogous to the present
case. In Beach, a University student was enrolled in a class that required participation in
three one-day field trips and three weekend field trips. The final trip was a three-day
camp-out. On the third evening of the trip, Beach became disoriented when returning to
her tent for the night. After a fellow student discovered Beach was missing, a search was
initiated, and Beach was found the next day after she had fallen in a rocky area and
sustained injuries that rendered her quadriplegic. In her suit against the University and
numerous University officials, Beach argued that the University and the professor who
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taught the class "breached their affirmative duty to supervise and protect her." Beach,
726 P.2d at 415. The trial court granted summary judgment for the defendants. On
appeal, it was conceded "that the mere relationship of student to teacher was not enough
to give rise to such a duty." Id at 416. The Utah Supreme Court held that in order to
prevail, Beach must establish a special duty by "distinguishing] her circumstances from
those of the other students on the field trip." Id Stating that "[t]he essence of a special
relationship is dependence by one party upon the other or mutual dependence between the
parties" (id at 415-16), the court declared, "The law imposes upon one party an
affirmative duty to act only when certain special relationships exist between the parties.
These relationships generally arise when one assumes responsibility for anotherfs safety
or deprives another of his or her normal opportunities for self-protection." Id. at 415.
Finding that nothing put the professor on notice that Beach's judgment, skills, and
physical condition were different from "any normal twenty-year-old college student" (id
at 416), the court affirmed judgment for the defendants. In analyzing the claim, the court
observed that
[determining whether one party has an affirmative duty to protect
another from the other's own acts or those of a third party requires a careful
consideration of the consequences for the parties and society at large. If the
duty is realistically incapable of performance, or if it is fundamentally at
odds with the nature of the parties1 relationship, we should be loath to term
that relationship "special" and to impose a resulting "duty," for it is
meaningless to speak of "special relationships" and "duties" in the abstract.
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Id at 418. The Beach opinion expressly contrasts the student-teacher relationship to
relationships considered inherently special, such as those identified in DCR Inc. v. Peak
Alarm Co., 663 P.2d 433 (Utah 1983). See Beach, 726 P.2d at 415 n.2. Relying on DCR
to establish a duty, Webb fails to perceive the difference.
Webb's brief pays only lip service to Beach. In a footnote (see Aplt. Brief at 6
n.l), Webb ignores the Beach court's careful analysis of the special relationship doctrine
altogether. While he attempts to distinguish his case factually from Beach, the attempted
distinction—that "Webb's injuries are alleged to be directly caused from the negligent
instruction he received while in class as opposed to the injuries which were caused by the
self-created damages and events which occurred after class in Beach" (Aplt. Brief at 6
n. 1)—has no bearing on the analysis the Beach court used to reach its decision. Applying
the Beach court's rationale to Webb's complaint shows that the University did not owe a
special duty of care to Webb.
Under Beach, Webb must distinguish his circumstances from those of the other
students on the field trip in order to establish a special relationship conferring a duty on
the University. However, nothing in the record shows that Webb's circumstances differed
from the circumstances of his fellow students. The allegations of the complaint do not set
Webb apart from his classmates in any significant way. They state only that Webb was
enrolled in a University class (R. 2, ^ 6); that a field trip was scheduled for the class (R. 2,
Tf 7); that the students were taken to certain property to examine fault lines (R. 2,fflj8-9);
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that sidewalks on the property were covered with snow and ice (R. 2, ^j 10); and that a
fellow student slipped, causing Webb to fall as she steadied herself (R. 2, ^ 11). As in
Beach, nothing suggests that Webb did not have the judgment, skills, or physical
condition of a normal college student. Nor is there any suggestion that walking in the
presence of icy sidewalks and fellow pedestrians is a skill beyond the ability of the typical
student. There is no indication that the University assumed responsibility for Webb's
safety or deprived him of his normal opportunities for self-protection. Under these
circumstances, requiring the University to protect an adult student from accidentally
falling on the same kinds of icy sidewalks encountered by the public at large is a duty
realistically incapable of performance that cannot support a special relationship. Webb's
failure to provide relevant analysis on point is telling. The only fact he presents to
support his contention that the University had a duty to him is his status as a student.
Beach establishes that the student-teacher relationship, by itself, is simply not enough.
The special duty doctrine is well-established in Utah law. "To hold a government
agency or one of its agents liable for negligence or gross negligence, a plaintiff cannot
recover for the breach of a duty owed to the general public, but must show that a duty is
owed to him or her as an individual." Madsen v. Borthick. 850 P.2d 442, 444 (Utah
1993): see also Hunsaker v. State. 870 P.2d 893, 897 (Utah 1993) (duty premised on
special relationship is "necessary premise for any negligence liability of the State actors");
Ferre v. State. 784 P.2d 149, 151 (Utah 1989) ("plaintiff must show a breach of duty

9

owed him as an individual, not merely the breach of an obligation owed to the general
public at large by the governmental official"); Higgins v. Salt Lake County, 855 P.2d 231,
236 (Utah 1993) (same); Cannon v. Univ. of Utah, 866 P.2d 586, 589 (Utah App. 1993)
("where the government deals generally with the welfare of all, it does so without a duty
to anyone, unless there is a 'special relationship* between the government and the
individual").
Webb places primary reliance on Delbridge v. Maricopa County Community
College District 182 Ariz. 55, 893 P.2d 55 (Ariz. App. 1994), to establish a duty on the
part of the University. Delbridge, however, is readily distinguishable. In direct
contradiction to the concession in Beach, Delbridge states, "The teacher-student
relationship is a special one, affording the student protection from unreasonable risks of
harm." Delbridge, 182 Ariz, at 58, 893 P.2d at 58. However, the special relationship in
Delbridge is predicated on a statutory duty under Arizona law to "provide for adequate
supervision over pupils in instructional and noninstructional activities." Collette v.
Tolleson Unified Sch. Dist., 203 Ariz. 359, 363 n.3, 54 P.3d 828, 832 n.3 (Ariz. App.
2002): see also Chavez v. Tolleson Elementary Sch. Dist., 122 Ariz. 472, 475, 595 P.2d
1017, 1020 (Ariz. App. 1979). Moreover, Delbridge was decided after the Supreme
Court of Arizona, in contrast to Utah's appellate courts, explicitly rejected the special duty
doctrine, stating, "We shall no longer engage in the speculative exercise of determining
whether the tortfeasor has a general duty to the injured party, which spells no recovery, or
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if he had a specific individual duty which means recovery.11 Ryan v. State. 134 Ariz. 308,
310, 656 P.2d 597, 599 (Ariz. 1982).1 Because Utah law contains no statutory duty
similar to Arizona's, Delbridge is inapposite to the analysis of the duty issue presented
here.
The other cases Webb cites are equally unpersuasive. Both Nova Southeastern
University v. Gross. 758 So.2d 86 (Fla. 2000), and Gross v. Family Services Agency. 716
So.2d 337 (Fla. App. 1998), deal with claims against a private university, so no issue of a
public university's duty in the absence of a special relationship is involved. The
institutions sued in Brigham Young University v. Lillvwhite. 118 F.2d 836 (10th Cir.
1941), Kleinknecht v. Gettysburg College. 989 F.2d 1360 (3d Cir. 1993), and Kirchner v.
Yale University. 150 Conn. 623, 192 A.2d 641 (1963), likewise are private entities, not
public institutions, and consequently lack analysis under the special duty doctrine. To the
extent that Webb's remaining cases find a duty of care owed by a public university to its

'As a result of Ryan's abandonment of the distinction between general and special
duty (see Clouse v. State. 194 Ariz. 473, 476, 984 P.2d 559, 562 (Ariz. App. 1999)), the
Arizona legislature passed comprehensive legislation in 1984 "which governs the
immunity and liability of public entities and employees." Johnson v. Superior Court. 158
Ariz. 507, 508, 763 P.2d 1382, 1383 (Ariz. App. 1988). Unlike the Utah Governmental
Immunity Act, which maintains sovereign immunity for all but explicitly excepted causes
of action, Arizona's legislation proceeds from the opposite perspective: "fthat public
entities are liable for acts and omissions of employees in accordance with the statutes and
common law of [Arizona].1" Clouse. 194 Ariz, at 476-77, 984 P.2d at 563-64 (quoting
Citv of Tucson v. Fahrinser. 164 Ariz. 599, 600, 795 P.2d 819, 820 (1990)). Thus, while
Ryan has been abrogated by statute, its rejection of the "special duty" doctrine is still
good law as codified in statute. For this reason, Arizona case law regarding a university's
duty to its students is meaningless to a determination of duty under Utah law.
11

students, the duty is owed to the students in general—the very position that Utah's
recognition of the special duty doctrine rejects. See Hores v. Sargent. 230 A.D.2d 712,
712, 646 N.Y.S.2d 165, 166 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996) (finding community college's
comprehensive organization, planning, and supervision of student bicycle trip through its
Office of Student Activities sufficient to confer ,fa duty to take reasonable precautions for
the safety of the participants11); Kvriazis v. University of West Virginia. 192 W. Va. 60,
66, 450 S.E.2d 649, 655 (1994) ("As an enterprise charged with a duty of public service
here, the University owes a duty of due care to its students when it encourages them to
participate in any sport."); Whittington v. Sowela Technical Institute. 438 So.2d 236, 247
(La. App. 1983) (stating, without analysis, "that Sowela owed a duty to its students to
provide transportation under safe conditions").
While finding a general duty of care may be laudable public policy from Webb's
perspective, it is not the law in Utah. Beach and the other Utah cases requiring a plaintiff
to establish a duty owed to him individually in order to recover for his injury represent
controlling authority over Webb's claim. Webb has identified no Utah precedent that
provides grounds for reversal of the district court's dismissal of his complaint for failure
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. While other jurisdictions may have
reached contrary results, they have not done so under the special duty doctrine
consistently applied in Utah decisions. Because the district court correctly dismissed
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Webb's claim against the University for his failure to show a duty owed to him
individually, its decision is entitled to affirmance by this Court.
CONCLUSION
Webb's attempt to introduce a contract theory not presented to the district court,
unsupported by any citation to the record or alternative ground for seeking review, is not
appropriately before this Court for decision. The sole issue for appellate determination,
whether the University had a special relationship with Webb giving rise to a duty, is
governed by controlling precedent. Because Webb did not establish any duty owed to
him individually, the district court correctly dismissed his claim against the University.
Webb's disagreement with the result does not change the outcome under well-established
Utah law: absent a special relationship, the University has no duty on which liability can
be predicated. For these reasons, as more fully explained above, the University of Utah
respectfully requests the Court to affirm the order of dismissal entered by the district
court.

13

STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT
Because the issue in this case is governed by controlling precedent, the University
does not believe oral argument is necessary to the appropriate disposition of this appeal.
However, the University desires to participate if oral argument is ordered by the Court.
Dated this Idr

day of July, 2003.

L

NANCYL>KEMP
Assistant Attorney General
Attorney for Defendant/Appellee
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on this (4*- day of July, 2003,1 caused to be mailed, first
class postage prepaid, two true and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF
APPELLEE to the following:
Brent Gordon
Driggs, Bills & Day, P.C.
331 South 600 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102

ADDENDUM A

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
—00O00—

James Webb,

No. 20000181
Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.
The University of Utah, a division of
the state of Utah,

Defendant University of Utah's motion for summary dismissal is granted. The appeal
was taken from a non-final order, as parties remain before the trial court and plaintiff did not
request certification of the dismissal order. The dismissal is without prejudice.

BY THE COURT:

^77-Z^M f,
Date

Q~VO^
Ricliard C. Howe
Chief Justice

ADDENDUM B

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

^ e 2? 2001
PauteOeStagg
® e r t t of the Court

00O00

James Webb,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

ORDER CONSOLIDATING AND
DISMISSING APPEALS
Case No. 20000881-CA

v.

-Case—]
rr^l5

University of Utah, a
division of the State of
Utah,

fiJl<^

Defendant and Appellee.

Before Judges Jackson, Bench, and Davis

OFFICE Or THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
CHILD PROTECTION

These cases represent an appeal from a single order of the
trial court and are accordingly consolidated under case number
20000881-CA.
Our review of the record convinces us that this case
involving multiple defendants was not properly certified under
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b). Under the rule, "the court
may direct the entry of a final judgment as to one or more but
fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon an express
determination by the court that there is no just reason for delay
and upon an express direction for the entry of judgment." Here,
although the trial court's order stated that "plaintiff shall
have a final and appealable order," the court did not make an
express finding that there was no just reason for delay supported
by a statement of the reasons for the finding. Bennion v.
Pennzoil. 826 P.2d 137, 139 (Utah 1992). A judgment is not final
"merely because the order so recites." Little v. Mitchell, 604
P.2d 918, 919 (Utah 1979).
Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the appeal is
dismissed without prejudice.
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Norman H. Jackson,
Associate Presiding Judge

fes^^i
Russell W. Bench, Judge

rames Z.

20000881-CA

ris,

Judge

